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Introduction
The fifty days of the ‘COVID-19 and States of Emergency’ Symposium covered the height
of the global legal reaction to the pandemic, offering a snapshot of countries in collective
crisis. It began with a call for a global conversation on the kind of legal norms which
should govern the situation of worldwide pandemic. This final contribution aims to trace
the central themes, questions and issues raised by the Symposium. It considers
constitutional safeguards on a ‘state of emergency’, and whether this is preferable to the
use of ordinary legislation in managing a crisis. It examines the dangers of executive
action, and whether countries have been successful in limiting the potential for abuse, as
well as preventing or sanctioning it. It examines how states have struggled to maintain
some degree of legislative and judicial normality, while other states have given it up
entirely. Finally, it identifies the most successful approaches adopted, and the most
detrimental. In doing so, it aims to form part of that global conversation which seeks to
identify the most concerning legal developments in a global emergency, but also to
advocate for the best practices emerging worldwide.
States inEmergency
Extraordinary Powers in Ordinary Law
Debate has raged around the degree to which countries have been prepared for the
threat of a pandemic, let alone one unparalleled in its current scale and impact. In the
initial phase of the crisis, most states responded with government decrees or
administrative decisions – sometimes with questionable legal basis. A question is
whether countries would benefit from stronger legal basis for action.
A number of states have relied on ordinary legislation to manage the crisis without
resorting to emergency powers, even where such powers are available in the legal or
constitutional framework. The reasons have varied: either the crisis did not constitute an
‘emergency’ within constitutional provisions; or there were sufficient powers and/or
mechanisms within ordinary legislation, and thus no need to resort to emergency
powers. Nevertheless, it should be underlined that declaring a state of emergency does
not indicate a potential abuse of power, any more than the exclusive use of ordinary
legislation means that there is no abuse. Many states that have used ordinary legislation
avoided the scrutiny and conditionality which normally attaches to the use of emergency
powers. Others by contrast are concerned with the negative historical connotations in
light of past use of emergency powers, and so have used ordinary provisions that might
be even less suitable.
1/13
An important point of consideration is whether the use of pre-existing legislation reveals
ordinary powers to be extraordinary in their scope. Many countries have relied on Health
Acts to provide the legal basis for sweeping powers for detention, quarantine, and even
lockdown. A tangible concern is the interpretation of ordinary legislation to the effect
that it allows action that ought to have been held ultra vires. For example the UK’s Public
Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 allows a Minister to make a ‘special restriction or
requirement’ ‘on where [a person] goes or with whom [a person] has contact’. To
interpret these sections as authorising a nationwide lockdown of the entire population is
questionable at best.
In many cases, the Health Acts initially relied upon were promulgated in very different
times (eg Nepal’s 1964 Infectious Diseases Act; and India’s Epidemic Diseases Act 1897).
To provide legal basis for the unprecedented nature of restrictions, many states
amended existing public health legislation. The speed of amendments in some countries
however afforded extraordinarily little time for meaningful review (from 4 days in the UK,
to only 12 hours in Denmark) and the quality of the law can suffer. Following a storm of
protest from legal scholars, lawyers and judges for the secrecy and lack of accountable
input, the Norwegian government, radically revised its initial draft law on action
concerning the coronavirus. Finland offers an example of best practice for the pluralistic
review of constitutionality and rights-compliance of executive decrees through standing
committees and engagement with external legal and constitutional experts. Finland also
deserves special mention for inviting public scrutiny of decrees through real-time posting
on a legal blog.
While emergency necessitates urgent action, there is always capacity for subsequent
review and reform. On this point, Italy is exemplary. The country suffered one of the
highest mortality rates in Europe. It was among the first to introduce restrictive
measures, and the second globally behind China to introduce a national lockdown. The
initial measures diverged at local, regional and national level, and were introduced so
quickly and haphazardly as to create ‘regulatory and legal chaos’. However, this changed:
responding to the criticism from academics, lawyers and the media directed at earlier
provisions the Italian government reformed the legal measures to include clear
constitutional safeguards and protections for the rule of law. This trend echoed across
the EU (with the notable exception of Hungary and Poland): initial legal shortcomings
were subsequently rectified.
It is highly probable that this decade will witness numerous constitutional amendments
and legislation governing health emergencies to take account of global crises, and some
key insights may be gleaned from collective experience. Ongoing stakeholder
engagement – involving external constitutional and legal experts – and readiness to
reform creates better-quality law.
Wherefore a ‘State of Emergency’?
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Many countries, though not all, have declared a state of emergency in response to
COVID-19. There are broadly four common elements to provisions on a ‘state of
emergency’ (including (1) conditions for its declaration; (2) a delegation of power; (3)
limitations on its use; (4) provisions for legislative or judicial oversight). The situations
justifying the declaration of a state of emergency, however, are intricately linked with
national historical experience. Most constitutions stipulate war, external aggression, or
armed rebellion as a condition for declaration. Only a few refer to a natural disaster, and
less still refer to an epidemic or health emergency. Some constitutions contain more
open-ended and interpretable conditions. For example in Malaysia, a state of emergency
can be declared where the King believes there to be serious threat to ‘security’, ‘economic
life’, or ‘public order’.
There is no strong indication of whether constitutional safeguards can limit the potential
for abuse of emergency powers. Following 2011 constitutional reform, the 1917
Constitution of Mexico envisions the oversight by both judicial and legislative branches,
and these political and legal safeguards against its misuse cannot be overridden by the
executive. Despite numerous situations which may have called for a state of emergency:
it has only been declared once in 1942 during World War II and has not been declared in
the current crisis. In contrast, some states have existed in a near perpetual state of
emergency despite safeguards. The 2014 Egyptian Constitution was drafted with
intention of bringing an end to the near-perpetual state of emergency since 1967. The
safeguards introduced, including two-thirds approval of the House of Representatives,
have been however sidestepped through formalistic proceduralism. Egypt did not declare
a state of emergency through the coronavirus crisis because it has never left such a state
for more than a few days since 2017.
Some states avoid the term entirely: having experienced a two-year state of emergency
following terrorist attacks in 2015, France declared a new state of a ‘health emergency’
which mimics the pre-existing provisions for a state of emergency, though only provides
a more limited role for parliament and did not derogate from the European Convention
on Human Rights [ECHR] and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
[ICCPR]. An ‘unofficial’ state of emergency can create equal cause for concern: the call of
a  ‘general holiday’ in Bangladesh to avoid the negative associations of a state of
emergency, belies the gravity of the situation and misleads the population into high-risk
behaviours including mass-migration. A negative experience of the abuse of emergency
power led Japan to omit an emergency clause in the 1947 Constitution. This has led to
recent debate divided between those arguing that a clause would limit the potential for
abuse; and those who contend that the existence of such a clause would be open to
abuse.
Many states are highly prescriptive in the conditions attaching to a state of emergency.
The Constitutions of Estonia, and Chile define varying levels of emergency, each with
corresponding powers and conditionality over their use. The Constitutions reserve the
most serious levels to parliamentary approval. Both declared a state of emergency: in
Chile the estado de catástrofe; and in Estonia the eriolukord, which are declared by the
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executive, and do not require parliamentary approval. Both countries notified
derogations under the American Convention on Human Rights [ACHR] and ECHR
respectively, and also under the ICCPR. On paper this is compliant with the rule of law
and individual rights. In practice, however, both states reveal worrying trends in their use
of emergency powers.
Ultimately, even where constitutional provisions on states of emergency are robust from
the perspective of democratic oversight, individual rights and the rule of law; it is clear
that compliance also lies in executive commitment to constitutional and legal order, and
whether or not there is sufficient separation of powers to ensure it. Without an
independent judiciary or parliamentary oversight to enforce constitutional norms, a
constitution is little more than words on paper.
The Limits of Executive Action
Due to the urgency of action needed in emergency conditions, it is understood that
executive measures do not undergo the same level of scrutiny or stages of approval. This
does not mean, nor should it, that the use of emergency power is without limits or
conditions, or that state agents should be allowed to act with impunity. The underlying
danger of the use of emergency power, is that it may be used to introduce government
policy without legislative debate or to consolidate power in the executive, and not to
mitigate the negative consequences of an emergency. The almost unlimited legislative
power given to the Hungarian government has since been used to suspend the
operation of the GDPR in Hungary, and to transfer the most profitable revenue-sources
for local governments to county governments in areas controlled by opposition parties –
both of which have no plausible connection with COVID-19.
Executive action without legal justification or adequate legal basis, exemplified in
unpublished decisions and government circulars, can create legal chaos in a situation
that calls for clear communication, and legal certainty. The dangers of vague provisions
make executive exploitation possible. One of the most pressing concerns is temporality:
although the current crisis will not be permanent, some countries are permanently
shifting the balance of power resulting in executive decision-making that is all but
unaccountable. Executive action should always be subject to important restraints
including political (eg parliamentary approval) as well as substantive (eg the inviolability
of absolute rights) and procedural safeguards (eg judicial review).
When seeking to identify best practice to protect against unintentional misuse or
downright abuse of power, there are some simple, and universal principles. The
delegation of power must be time-limited, and clear as to legitimate scope for its use.
The use of power must be legally prescribed and proportionate to that legitimate aim.
There must be meaningful oversight by an independent body, as well as the possibility
for review for those subject to the law.
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The impact of COVID-19 on Democracy, Justice and Human
Rights
#Democracy
Ensuring the continuity of the core constitutional functions of the legislature has been a 
challenge for all countries. Some states adopted provisions to allow for virtual assembly 
and voting, or enacted modifications to procedures, in order to allow institutions to 
function as normally as possible. In some cases, however, the parliament was entirely 
left out, suspended or threatened with dissolution by the executive. States in the middle 
of election cycles have been faced with the challenges of governing a pandemic without a 
government. This led to interim governments adopting sweeping measures, and also to 
power struggles when minority government have tried to handle the crisis. The 
separation of powers is designed to ensure constitutional checks on the use of power. It 
is all the more important in a situation where urgency and extreme measures can be 
justified, but becomes difficult to sustain where the executive is at odds with the 
Parliamentary majority.
Elections and referenda have been cancelled or rescheduled in many countries. The 
disruption of which has caused significant concern. However, of equal concern are states 
that stick to their election schedules, but ignore constitutional and international 
standards regarding free and fair elections while also failing to introduce any protective 
measures, forcing the electorate to choose between their democratic right to vote, and 
the health of themselves, their family and their community. Poland’s surreal capitulation 
on the presidential election exposed constitutional tragedy amid political farce, when the 
leader of the executive announced the Supreme Court was going to annul an election 
that had not happened, before the Supreme Court has become seized of the matter.
Where elections are suspended, unfree and/or unfair, public expression of 
dissatisfaction with government is reduced to political campaigning, and public protest 
both of which are difficult, if not impossible, under current lockdown or restricted 
movement regimes. In Chile, the government has been able to capitalise on the 
pandemic to curb or limit civil unrest and public protest against the government. Where 
‘chaos is method’, the opportunity to consolidate autocratic regimes is enhanced in 
emergency: Venzeuela, in a state of exception since 2016, has been able halt public 
protests and to hide a widespread lack of resources, through measures designed to limit 
the spread of the virus. However, where such capacity for public demonstrations is 
limited, alternative means including digital protest have risen. Online activism can shape 
public policy. In Indonesia, the ‘#LockDownOrDie’ movement on social media led to 
changes in government policy amid widespread distrust of the executive’s handling of 
the situation.
While strategies to combat COVID-19 have limited democratic input, and parliamentary 
oversight, it is inevitable that the decisions made by governments now will have lasting 
impact on their electoral systems (and prospects) in the years to come. 
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The Interdependence of Rights
There has been a broad variance in the degree to which states have engaged with
international institutions by derogating from international human rights instruments
including the ACHR, ECHR and ICCPR. For many states derogation appears a mere
extension, or pure formality, of the declaration of a state of emergency. For example,
Chile is one of the few states which actively distinguished constitutional and
international rights. Thus, there is debate whether derogation can actually limit potential
rights violations, particularly where enforcement of the ACHR, ECHR or ICCPR is
comparatively weak.
On a national level, questions have been raised regarding the balance of individual rights
and public health, as well as the question of what legal and moral duties are owed by the
state to its citizens. Some have argued for the (re)conceptualization of the ‘right to life’ to
be interpreted as the positive obligation to protect the life and health of the public, and
even as a constitutional duty to prevent the spread of coronavirus. The central
contention is that ‘rights-respecting’ public authority should be about more than avoiding
interference with individual rights, but instead be understood as the responsibility of
government to ensure the welfare of its citizens. One common understanding, however,
is that the ‘rights versus public health’ paradigm is fundamentally flawed. Rights-
respecting measures which secure public confidence are ‘more likely to be more effective
and sustainable over time than arbitrary or repressive ones’.
Countries with well-functioning healthcare systems, particularly those considered
‘sacrosanct’ in the political culture, are inevitably better placed to tackle a major health
crisis than those which have weak or dysfunctional health systems, or whose systems are
already in a state of total collapse prior to the crisis. Chronic shortages in medical
supplies, coupled with limited availability of tests, and compounded by wide-scale and
systemic corruption where sudden influx of emergency funds incentivises opportunism,
create the worst panoply of conditions for the spread of infection.
Measures implemented to prevent or slow the spread of the virus have a
disproportionately negative impact on vulnerable categories of people including the
elderly, prisoners, those with physical or mental disabilities, migrants, ethnic minorities,
and refugees. The sudden onset of mass unemployment of part-time, low-income, and
informal workers, coinciding with the shut-down of childcare and schools, has also
disproportionately affected women. Worse, under stay-at-home orders, women and
children also face escalating rates of domestic violence, and a majority of governments
have failed to take preventive measures. For the millions living with poverty,
malnutrition, or with high rates of potential comorbidities including TB and HIV, in
cramped conditions and with limited access to water, the most prevalent political and
medical messaging of ‘stay home and wash your hands’ reveals ignorance of endemic
socio-economic disparity and reveals the endemic structural inequalities. For the most
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vulnerable populations, the threat of COVID-19 is a choice between staying home or 
risking infection, but must instead be weighed against losing access to the most basic 
needs of food, adequate housing, and sanitation.
Virtual Justice
A central concern of legal analysts has been the functioning of the judicial system. This is 
necessary not only for the ordinary administration of justice, but even more important in 
respect of judicial review (where provided) of actions taken in an emergency. As could be 
expected, the COVID-19 crisis has brought delays to sometimes already back-logged 
justice systems. Many states have nevertheless endeavoured to ensure the continuity of 
the courts, for example through suspension of oral arguments and their replacement 
with written submissions. The most notable innovation, however, has been the increase 
of legislative measures to introduce ‘e-justice’ through audio-visual conferencing, or 
measures to make remote access more widely available. Nonetheless, putting 
defendants, and particularly vulnerable defendants, on a ‘Skype trial’ raises a number of 
concerns about how to guarantee a fair trial online. Practical concerns of access to a 
computer, and a stable internet connection are at the forefront, while – almost inevitably 
– the neutral background of a courtroom is replaced with the intimate (and potentially 
prejudicial) setting of a home, hotel, prison, or refuge.
These are, however, practical and not principled challenges which can be overcome. It is 
far more concerning when the justice system is suspended altogether. Relying on the 
justification of preventing the spread of the virus, executive restrictions on access to 
justice have been the greatest worry: measures have included freezing courts, limiting 
access to ‘extremely urgent’ or critical cases; or giving sole access to violations of 
coronavirus measures. Israel closed courts to all except urgent matters when, 
coincidentally, a senior political figure was on trial for corruption. This endangers the 
protection of rights through the ordinary administration of justice. While there are 
practical (and even sartorial) issues associated with allowing remote trials, virtual justice 
is always better than none.
On the question of the review of executive use of emergency powers, and the intensity 
of review it should be afforded, proportionality must be decisive. However, many states 
may not employ this reasoning at all, as they exclude emergency measures from the 
scope of review. Hungary closed ordinary courts altogether and thus cut off the 
possibility for review of the proportionality of measures introduced under emergency 
conditions. In Thailand, an ouster clause precludes administrative review of regulations 
made under emergency legislation. In Czechia, even while courts have annulled some 
restrictive measures by the Ministry of Health, they still refused (on a split decision) to 
review the declaration of a state of emergency for lack of competence. The Romanian 
Constitutional Court refused jurisdiction but, in doing so, implicitly held that presidential 
decrees are outside the reach of both the Parliament and the Constitutional Court. 
Conversely, the Spanish Supreme Court refused to review the declaration of a state of 
emergency as this was properly a matter for the Constitutional Court.
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The exclusion of executive action entirely from the scope of review is a profound
concern, especially where courts lack any degree of independence, and particularly
where there is little scope for either political or popular objection through elections or
protests. Court action can be a positive agent for change, and the role of an independent
judiciary is essential, particularly where emergency measures might unconstitutionally
limit rights.
Controlling COVID-19
Trust and Transparency
Measures on the scale witnessed across the world, from social distancing to national
lockdown, rely to the greatest extent on public acceptance and commitment. A common
factor amongst the most successful states in epidemiological terms has been high levels
of transparency in the decision-making process. Where transparency underlies the
government action, there is a strong correlation with public trust in the actions that are
taken. Related to this is a nuanced question of expertise: in an epidemic, who should
make the rules to regulate risk? Across the world, there have been instances of a radical
reformulation of roles: medical practitioners as detention officers; military as police;
police and soldiers as doctors; doctors as politicians; and the public as epidemiologists.
The answer most likely lies in a co-ordinated effort of diverse and relevant expertise.
Sweden’s measures in response to COVID-19 have been reported internationally, by
some to exemplify a preferable alternative to highly restrictive measures. Premised on
high levels of public trust, the Swedish approach was to collectivise responsibility, both at
government level and among individuals. Public health recommendations on social
distancing were introduced, accompanied by measures (albeit comparatively minimal) to
limit gatherings of groups, as well as by closures of businesses and schools. The efficacy
of this approach, advocating primarily social responsibility over lockdown might however
be vindicated in the future with a lower rate of resurgence. However, Sweden has
currently a higher mortality rate than its neighbours Denmark, Norway and Finland.
Nevertheless, trust-based policies so far deliver the best outcomes. New Zealand has all
but eliminated COVID-19 within its borders doing so by a combination of ordinary legal
powers, and some emergency provisions, centrally driven by social nudges
communicated through clear, consistent and constant government messaging. As an
‘effective rationalist’, Prime Minister Jacinda Arden repeatedly underlined the central
message of social responsibility and thus met ‘rule-of-law expectations about clarity,
certainty, accessibility and congruence in application’. Iceland’s ‘rule of common sense’
has similarly been driven by clear government guidelines, recommendations and daily
expert advice, with promising outcomes.
Where there is an emphasis on individual responsibility, guidance must be clear,
consistent and accessible. Incoherent or inconsistent government messaging with
frequently changing rules and restrictions leads to critical uncertainty and low
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compliance. In the worst case, this can ‘[drown] the inhabitants in a hypertrophy of legal
rules, exceptions, and exceptions from the exceptions’. No one should be expected to
have a legal education to understand what rules apply to them. Equally, elected or
government officials should never ignore the rules that they have themselves designed,
at the risk of critically undermining their own legitimacy and the rules’ efficacy.
Clear, accessible, consistent, correct, and constant guidance, with officials leading by
example, is essential. Ireland sets a good example here with providing clear and
accessible information. This not only has the effect of tackling the spread of
misinformation on the virus but is also critical to ensure legal certainty and guarantee
the transparency of government action. Based on current trends, the Nordic, Irish and
Kiwi experience evidences that high trust in transparent government action, paired with
a strong sense of personal social responsibility based on clear and consistent expert
advice, can lead to the most positive outcomes on average.
Sanction and Surveillance
One of the most concerning and widely reported developments has been the
criminalisation of breaking COVID-19 measures, often with penalties that are
disproportionate to the country’s median wage: for example, large fines, and extended
prison sentences for non-compliance with lockdown orders. States which have
introduced provisions criminalising acts likely to spread the disease has led in some
cases to mass arrests. While not only caused by the pandemic, extra-judicial killings and
police brutality in the enforcement of government mandates have also occurred in some
states. Some sanctions are not only criminal: for example, Poland has introduced
disproportionate administrative fines for breach of lockdown orders. The recourse to
administrative rather than criminal measures avoids the obligation of a court hearing
and the opportunity for defence. For that reason, it is also potentially unconstitutional.
Paired with criminalisation of COVID-related behaviour are state censorship and
restrictions on freedom of expression. A number of states have introduced criminal
offences related to ‘miscommunication’ or the publication of false or misleading
assertions related to the epidemic and the measures introduced by governments to
tackle it. Such offences are often drafted in terms general enough to ensure that political
opponents fall within their scope, and have been introduced as permanent changes to
criminal codes. In Belarus, otherwise in a state of denial concerning the reality of
coronavirus, a chilling effect on reporting the virus has been created through arrests of
journalists and doctors, thereby masking the true extent of infection and mortality.
A related concern is the right to privacy as countries worldwide introduce provisions to
allow the collection of personal data in an effort to track the virus. The forms of tracking
have varied: from the requirement to send ‘selfies’ as proof of staying at home, to the
deployment of tracking software, designed for national security or military purposes. The
key concerns are that the use of this technology by government or the police is without
either the consent or knowledge of individuals; and without any degree of judicial or
political oversight. While tracking of personal data has wide potential for misuse, unless
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the population are strongly following norms already, it may have little potential for
limiting the spread of COVID-19. Concerns over privacy and the potential for misuse have
produced widespread criticism and public protest. Israel was one of the first states to
moot the possibility of the security services’ use of software to track the virus, but later
backed down following protests. Similar proposals were introduced, and rejected after
public outcry in Slovenia. In contrast, China has tracked its citizens prior to COVID; and
Muscovite citizens on public or private transport are now required to carry a digital pass
issued by government as part of a system which is now expanding throughout Russia.
Higher rates of criminalisation and surveillance powers strongly correlate with the
militarisation of response to a civilian and public health crisis. An authoritarian rhetoric
of 'war' with the virus has been used to justify extreme or disproportionate measures
and/or restrictions on personal liberties. This has much more concerning dimension in
the assignment of civil functions to the military: for example, placing military personnel
in positions of power in government, hospitals and private enterprises; the assignment
of policing functions to the military, and even the prosecution of ordinary offences
through military courts. A militarisation of response correlates with less leniency (for
example, targeting the homeless) the higher use of force as a means of control. The
militarisation, criminalisation and severe sanctioning of coronavirus-related behaviours
has not, however, significantly correlated with better outcomes based on current trends.
It does, however, strongly correlate with autocratic and repressive governance, and a
weaker separation of powers.
Urgency, and Competence in Crisis
The obligation of states to act can be understood as the question of competence to act,
particularly where powers are divided among local, regional, and federal levels. While
divergent approaches to address the pandemic are (at least conceptually) coherent
across national borders, they are irrational within them. Inconsistent rules on social
distancing, travel restrictions, or the obligation to wear masks, create conflict and
uncertainty in practice.
Among federal systems, emergency powers are usually concentrated at federal level (the
USA and Australia are notable exceptions), while healthcare is devolved to state level.
Where the federal executive is at odds with state government in downplaying the threat
of COVID-19 the latter must step in to fill the vacuum in leadership. While there is a
convincing rationale for the localisation of emergency response based on speed and
local-awareness, its ultimate success depends on being complemented by a coordinated
national response. The political gain of relegating responsibility (and hence blame) to
adopt measures to regional governors is not offset by lower mortality rates, or likely to
ensure faster economic recovery. Denial or a reluctance by federal executive power to
respond cause the high costs of underreaction, and are only now beginning to show: the
USA and Brazil have quickly become the countries with the highest number of cases
globally.
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A lack of competence (rather than denial) can limit international intervention: the EU has
few relevant legal powers in healthcare, as the area remains the exclusive competence of
its Member States. There has been, as of yet, little meaningful or coordinated EU
response, which has led the EU to appear, at least institutionally, to fail critically at a time
when it was already in crisis. Member States, rather than the EU, closed internal borders.
The lasting impact of this absence could likely be a rebalancing of power (even if it was
only ever a perception that there had been an asymmetry) in favour of the Member
States. However, this is an incomplete vision. As countries begin to ‘exit the emergency’,
the EU could assume a critical role in the coordination of the re-opening of borders,
reflecting the larger role of international institutions in underpinning international
cooperation.
Ultimately, the speed of the reaction determines the outcome: the earlier the action, the
lower (or even non-existent) the mortality rate. As the UK has demonstrated to its terrible
loss, delayed reaction clearly correlates with the highest mortality rate in Europe, and
the second highest in the world. While there are justified concerns in overreaction, the
new parable of state action will warn against underreaction in a time of desperate
urgency. It will also underline that while urgent action is essential – it must confirm in so
far as possible in the first instance to the principles of legality, legal certainty, clarity, and
transparency; or be corrected to align to these principles as soon as practicable.
Exiting States of Emergency
There is neither a cure to COVID-19 nor vaccine to the coronavirus. At the time of writing,
confirmed cases have reached 5.5 million worldwide. After months of lockdown,
restrictions and closures, states are now beginning conversations about how to exit a
state of emergency. They must consider the how to design and implement long process
of removing or reducing measures to begin social and economic recovery. They do so in
‘a geopolitically shattered world’. Notable for their absence from discussion are global
and transnational institutions: they have largely been absent from decision-making. The
measures adopted to combat COVID-19 have been bound by both political borders and
by the reach of national budgets. This potentially heralds a new era of ultra-nationalism
and protectionism. But this is not inevitable. While nationalism has characterised the
initial legal and political responses to coronavirus, international cooperation on trade,
movement, medicine, and research will determine the next stage as we exit states of
emergency.
Once the immediate crisis has passed, there will be an opportunity for states and
international bodies to examine and review their constitutional and legal architecture, as
well as health and crisis response preparedness. In the reconstruction of emergency
frameworks, I offer these observations based on currently available data, and the
assumption of continuing trends. First, declaring a state of emergency or relying on
ordinary legislation made the likelihood of abuse of power no more nor less likely.
Rather, the effectiveness of legal safeguards against abuse depends on executive
observance of the rules, and on the strength of the separation of powers to enforce it.
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Second, the militarisation of response correlates strongly with criminalisation and
disproportionate sanctions, but it does not strongly correlate with better outcomes.
Third, silencing journalists and doctors can lead to the spread of misinformation; while
not engaging with (often justified) criticism of laws or applying double standards, can
mean rules are poorly followed. Fourth, and finally, while it is too early to identify the
best practice, there is emerging evidence of good practice: those state policies based on
legal certainty, transparency, clear communication, and early-reaction have strongly
correlated with lower mortality rates, and the sooner lifting of restrictions. These
principles are simple, and universal.
Ultimately, while national isolation has reduced infection; international co-operation will
ensure recovery.
With thanks to Alice Donald, Stefan Enchelmaier, Ciara Staunton, Laurent Pech, Laura
Bramley, Kim Lane Scheppele, and Tom Daly
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While you are here…
If you enjoyed reading this post – would you consider supporting our work? Just click
here. Thanks!
All the best, Max Steinbeis
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